Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade by Moldovanu, Benny et al.
SONDERFORSCHUNGSBEREICH 504
Rationalita¨tskonzepte,
Entscheidungsverhalten und
o¨konomische Modellierung
Universita¨t Mannheim
L 13,15
68131 Mannheim
No. 01-18
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade
Moldovanu, Benny
 
and Fieseler, Karsten
  
and Kittsteiner, Thomas
   
July 1999
We wish to thank the German Science Foundation for financial help through SFB 504 and GK ıˆFinanz-
und Guetermaerkteıˆ at the University of Mannheim. We have greatly benefitted from the comments
made by an associated editor and by two anonymous referees. We are also grateful to Jo¨rg Nikutta and
seminar participants at Bonn, Mannheim, University College London, and Tilburg for helpful remarks.
e-mail: mold@pool.uni-mannheim.de

Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, Germany, email: mold@pool.uni-mannheim.de

Sonderforschungsbereich 504, email: fieseler@pool.uni-mannheim.de

Sonderforschungsbereich 504, email: kittstei@econ.uni-mannheim.de
Partnerships, Lemons and E¢cient Trade
Karsten Fieseler Thomas Kittsteiner Benny Moldovanu¤
First Version: July 15, 1999
This Version: March 15, 2001
Abstract
We analyze the possibility of e¢cient trade with informationally interdependent
valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A crucial role is played by the sign of the
derivatives that measure how valuation functions depend on others’ signals. If valu-
ations are increasing functions of other agents’ signals, it is more di¢cult to achieve
e¢cient trade with interdependent values than with private values (where the re-
spective derivatives are zero.) In contrast, if valuations are decreasing functions of
other agents’ signals, it is easier to achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent val-
ues. Our results unify and generalize the insights of Cramton et al. [1987], Myerson
and Satterthwaite [1983], and Akerlof [1970].
1 Introduction
We inquire whether e¢cient trade can take place in environments where the agents’ val-
uations depend on their own private information and on the private information of other
agents. Such interdependence is natural in many trading situations, e.g., when a seller
has private information about the quality of the good which in‡uences the valuations of
both the seller and a potential buyer. Especially in situations where property rights are
initially dispersed among several agents (e.g., a partnership) it is natural to assume that
each agent has private information that also determines the other agents’ valuations. For
an illustration, consider the situation where each partner is responsible for a particular
project (or client, or operative part of the business, etc...) and where the projects are not
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related to each other. It is clear that an estimate of the value of the entire business can
be made only by having information on all projects. In addition to the ”standard” case
where private information in‡uences all agents’ valuations in the same direction (e.g., if
this information is about quality) situations where ”good” news for one agent turns out
to be ”bad” news for other agents are conceivable1. As an example, consider the follow-
ing excerpt taken from the Economist, 2001, which describes actions taken by partners
owning Formula 1 motor racing:
”...it would not be in Mr. Ecclestone’s long-term interest to forgo a deal
which could only enhance the value of his family’s remaining 50% stake in
SLEC...the other 50% stake in SLEC, owned by EM.TV, a debt-ridden Ger-
man media company, is up for sale. ... The uncertainty created by the dispute
between Mr. Eccelstone and Mr. Mosley might depress the value of EM.TV
holding. Could that work to Mr. Ecclestone’s advantage ? Quite possibly.
The lower the value of EM.TV’s stake, the higher the relative value of an op-
tion Mr. Ecclestone holds to sell a further 25% of SLEC to EM.TV for around
$1 billion - and the better the deal Mr. Ecclestone might be able to extract
for surrendering the option.”
Our paper has two parts. We …rst show how results from the auction and mechanism
design literature with private values can be adapted in order to analyze the possibility
of e¢cient trade in models with interdependent values. The second part illustrates the
advantages of this approach by analyzing in detail several trading situations with inter-
dependent values, and in particular the dissolution of a partnership.
The analysis employs three main steps:
1. If signals are independent2, we show that a Revenue Equivalence Theorem (in the
tradition of Myerson’s [1981] pioneering contribution) holds for incentive compatible
mechanisms in the interdependent valuation case3.
2. We next construct a value-maximizing, incentive-compatible mechanism. The stan-
dard Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (CGV) approach calls for transfers to agent i that de-
pend on the sum of the utilities of the other agents (in the implemented alternative)
But here such transfers will depend on i’s report, thus destroying incentives for
1This may be the case if agents are informed about mutually exclusive properties of the same asset,
which they want to use for di¤erent applications.
2Correlation among types can be used to extract all private information, thus circumventing many of
the problems addressed here. But, in such schemes, transfers to agents may grow arbitrarily large. If
there is some bound on these transfers (say, due to limited liability of agents in a partnership), we are
back to a setting where the questions raised in this paper play a role.
3Already Myerson himself allowed for a simple form of interdependent valuations, the so-called ”revi-
sion e¤ects”.
2
truthful revelation. Hence, we have to use a re…nement of the CGV approach. We
adapt for our purposes the mechanism described in Maskin [1992] for a one-sided
auction setting with one indivisible unit. Achieving incentive compatible value maxi-
mization is easy: the construction hinges on a single-crossing property which ensures
that the value-maximizing allocation is monotone in the agents’ signals.
3. Finally, using Revenue Equivalence, we note that it su¢ces to analyze the condi-
tions under which generalized CGV mechanisms (which are incentive compatible
and value-maximizing) satisfy individual rationality and budget-balancedness. For
private values, a similar approach has been used by Williams [1999] and Krishna
and Perry [1998] .
It is important to note that in the recent literature on one-sided auction settings with
interdependent values4, the seller (whose private information does not play a role) is a
”residual claimant” and receives all payments from the buyers. Budget-balancedness is
therefore costless and it is automatically satis…ed. Hence, the type of problem posed in
the present paper is completely absent in that literature5.
Our …rst application concerns the dissolution of a partnership. Cramton, Gibbons and
Klemperer [1987] look at situations where each one of several agents owns a fraction of a
good, and where agents have independent private values. Assuming symmetric distribu-
tions of agents’ valuations, they prove that e¢cient trade is always possible if the agents’
initial shares are equal6.
We analyze a model that uses the symmetry assumptions made by Cramton et. al.,
and where the private and common value components are separable. A comparison of
the cases with private and interdependent values reveals that a crucial role is played by
the sign of the derivatives of the common value components (note that the private values
case is exactly characterized by setting these derivatives equal to zero.)
If valuations are increasing functions of other agents’ signals, it is more di¢cult to
achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent values than with private values, since the
information revealed ex-post is always ”bad news” and the agents must be cautious in
order to avoid the respective (i.e. winner’s or loser’s) curses. Even if initial shares are
equal, it is not always possible to dissolve a partnership e¢ciently. Surprisingly, this
result continues to hold for arbitrarily small common value components. Indeed, for any
4See Maskin [1992], Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [1996], Ausubel [1997], Dasgupta and Maskin
[2000], and Perry and Reny [1999].
5Ignoring individual rationality or budget balancedness, Jehiel and Moldovanu [1998] show that value-
maximization is, per-se, inconsistent with incentive compatibility if valuations are interdependent and
if di¤erent coordinates of a multi-dimensional signal in‡uence utilities in di¤erent alternatives (as in a
general model of multi-object auctions).
6Schweizer [1998] has generalized this result by showing that, even if agents’ types are not drawn from
the same distribution, there always exists an initial distribution of property rights such that, ex-post, the
partnership can be e¢ciently dissolved.
3
symmetric and separable valuations that are increasing in other agents’ signals, we can
construct a symmetric distribution function such that e¢cient dissolution is impossible,
no matter what the initial distribution of property rights is.
If valuations are decreasing functions of other agents’ signals, the additional informa-
tion revealed ex-post is always a ”blessing”, and it turns out that it is easier to achieve
e¢cient trade with interdependent valuations. We show that, in this case, there exists
an open set of partnerships (around the equal partnership) that can always be dissolved
e¢ciently.
An important special case of the partnership model is the situation where, ex-ante,
the property rights belong to one agent. In a bilateral private values framework, Myerson
and Satterthwaite [1983] show that e¢cient trade is possible only in a setting where it is
common knowledge that the buyer’s lowest valuation exceeds the seller’s highest valuation.
The introduction of interdependent values allows us to connect the Myerson-Satterthwaite
result to Akerlof’s famous market for lemons [1970]. Akerlof examines a bilateral trading
situation where only the seller has private information, but this information in‡uences
both traders’ valuations. He gives an example where e¢cient trade is not possible even if
it is common knowledge that the buyer’s valuation always exceeds the seller’s valuation7.
With extreme ex-ante ownership, the ”worst-o¤” types of traders are unambiguously
de…ned, and we can relax some assumptions made for the analysis of partnerships. We
display a general existence condition for e¢cient trade that generalizes and uni…es both
Myerson-Satterthwaite’s and Akerlof’s classical contributions. We also show how e¢cient
trade can take place (even if its possibility is not common knowledge) if agents’ valuations
are decreasing in other agents’ signals. This positive result complements the negative re-
sult obtained by Gresik [1991]8 for the case of valuations that increase in other agents’
signals. Gresik derived an existence condition for e¢cient trade as a by-product of his
characterization of second-best bilateral mechanisms for several traders with interdepen-
dent values9.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. In section 3
we construct value-maximizing, incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valu-
ations, and we use a revenue equivalence result in order to derive conditions under which
7In that environment it su¢ces to analyze simple …xed-price mechanisms. Because private information
in our paper is two-sided, we cannot restrict attention to price mechanisms, and the analysis is more
complex. A detailed analysis of the Akerlof one-sided example using mechanism design techniques can
be found in Myerson [1985] and Samuelson [1984], which constructs second-best mechanisms.
8Other papers focused on impossibility results: Spier [1994] and Schweizer [1989] study models of
pretrial negotiation where the outcome of a trial depends on both parties’ signals. They observe that
not going to trial (which is e¢cient) cannot occur with probability one. Bester and Wärneyard [1998]
study a model of con‡ict resolution where agents are uncertain about each other’s …ghting potential, and
observe that con‡ict must arise with positive probability even if peaceful settlement is always e¢cient.
9Since the result is obtained via the solution of a variational problem, Gresik’s approach depends on
certain assumptions about virtual valuations. Such assumptions are not needed in our treatment
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such mechanisms are budget balanced and individually rational. In section 4 we general-
ize the Cramton et al. [1987] environment to the case with interdependent valuations. In
section 5 we brie‡y look at the case of bilateral trade. Concluding comments are gathered
in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
There are n risk-neutral agents and one good. Each agent i owns a fraction ®i of the
good, where 0 · ®i · 1 and
Pn
i=1 ®i = 1. We denote by µi the type of agent i , by µ
the vector µ = (µ1; :::; µn), and by µ¡i the vector µ¡i = (µ1; :::; µi¡1; µi+1; :::; µn). Types
are independently distributed. Type µi is drawn according to a commonly known density
function fi with support
£
µi; µi
¤
. The density fi is continuous and positive (a.e.), with
distribution Fi .
The valuation of agent i for the entire good is given by the function vi (µi; µ¡i) ; where
the arguments are always ordered by the agents’ indices: vi (µi; µ¡i) = vi (µ1; :::; µn). The
function vi (µi; µ¡i) is strictly increasing in µi, and continuously di¤erentiable. We further
assume the following single crossing property (SCP):
vi;i > vj;i 8 i; j 6= i: (SCP)
where vi;x (µ1; :::µn) denotes the x0th partial derivative of vi (µ1; :::; µn) : This assumption10
guarantees that the functions vi (¢; µ¡i) and vj (¢; µ¡i) are equal for at most one µi.
Agents have utility functions of the form qivi+mi where qi and mi represent the share
of the good and the money owned by i, respectively.
By the revelation principle, it su¢ces to analyze direct revelation mechanisms (DRM).
In a DRM agents report their types, relinquish their shares ®i of the good, and then receive
a payment ti (µ) and a share ki (µ) of the entire good. A DRM is therefore a game form ¡ =¡£
µ1; µ1
¤
; :::;
£
µn; µn
¤
; k; t
¢
, where k (µ) = (k1 (µ) ; :::; kn (µ)) is a vector with components
ki : £nj=1
£
µj; µj
¤ 7! [0; 1] such that Pni=1 ki (µ) = 1 8 µ; and t (µ) = (t1 (µ) ; :::; tn (µ)) is a
vector with components ti : £nj=1
£
µj; µj
¤ 7! R. We call the k and t the allocation rule and
the payments, respectively. To simplify notation, we refer to the pair (k; t) as a DRM if
it is clear which strategy sets
£
µi; µi
¤
are meant.
A mechanism (k; t) implements the allocation rule k if truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the game induced by ¡ and by the agents’ utility functions. Such a mech-
anism is called incentive compatible (IC). A mechanism is (ex post) e¢cient (EF) if it
implements an allocation rule where the agent with the highest valuation of the good
10Maskin [1992] shows that, without this assumption, the value-maximizing allocation may fail to be
monotone in types, and hence it may be impossible to implement it. If that allocation just happens to be
monotone (as in Akerlof’s original example where SCP is not satis…ed, but where the value-maximizing
allocation is constant) our main results also go through.
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always gets the entire good11. A mechanism is called (ex-ante) budget balanced (BB) if a
designer doesn’t expect to pay subsidies to the agents, e.g. Eµ [
Pn
i=1 ti (µ)] · 0. We call a
mechanism (interim) individual rational (IR) if every agent i who knows his type µi wants
to participate in the mechanism, given that all players report their types truthfully, e.g.
if Ui (µi) ¸ 0 for all µi; i = 1; ::; n, where Ui (µi) is the utility type µi expects to achieve
by participating in the mechanism.
We denote characteristic functions as follows:
1 (statement) :=
½
1; if statement is true
0; if statement is false
or 1A (x) :=
½
1; if x 2 A
0; if x =2 A:
3 E¢ciency and incentive compatibility
Our analysis uses three main ideas
² A revenue equivalence result implies that any two EF and IC mechanisms yield, up
to a constant, the same interim expected transfers.
² We display generalized Groves mechanisms that satisfy EF and IC for the case of
interdependent values.
² By revenue equivalence, it is enough to check under which conditions a generalized
Groves mechanism satis…es BB and IR to obtain general conditions for the existence
of EF, IC BB and IR mechanisms12.
Krishna and Perry [1998] and Williams [1999] have used the same combination for the
analysis of e¢cient trade in buyer-seller settings with private values.
3.1 The revenue equivalence theorem
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem constitutes the basis of most results in the mechanism-
design literature with quasi-linear utility functions, risk-neutral agents and independent
types. It states that expected payments are (up to a constant) the same in all IC mech-
anisms that implement the same allocation. Its proof can be easily extended to environ-
ments with interdependent valuations13.
11A more appropriate name for this property is value-maximization, since e¢ciency combines in fact
all properties listed here. But we keep the common jargon.
12Note that mechanisms that satisfy IC and EF without belonging to the CGV class do indeed exist.
For instance, Cramton et al. [1987] show that a double auction (which is not a CGV mechanism) dissolves
a partnership e¤ciently when agents have private values.
13Various such extensions can be found in Myerson (1981), Jehiel et.al. (1996), Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1999), and Krishna and Maenner (1999). None of these results covers the present setting.
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We …rst need some notation: The interim utility of agent i with type µi which partic-
ipates and announces the type bµi (while all the other agents report truthfully) is given
by
Ui
³
µi;bµi´ = Eµ¡i hvi (µi; µ¡i) ki ³bµi; µ¡i´¡ ®ivi (µi; µ¡i) + ti ³bµi; µ¡i´i
= : Vi
³
µi;bµi´+ Eµ¡i hti ³bµi; µ¡i´i
= : Vi
³
µi;bµi´+ Ti ³bµi´ :
To simplify notation we write:
Ui (µi) := Ui (µi; µi) :
Theorem 1 Assume that vi (µi; µ¡i) is continuously di¤erentiable in each component and
that for all bµi 2 [µi; µi] limµi!bµi ki (µi; µ¡i) = ki ³bµi; µ¡i´ for almost every µ¡i. Then,
for every IC mechanism (k; t) ; the interim expected utility of agent i in a truth-telling
equilibrium can be written as:
Ui (µi) = Ui(µi) +
Z µi
µi
Vi;1 (x; x) dx
= Ui(µi) +
Z µi
µi
Eµ¡i [vi;1 (x; µ¡i) (ki (x; µ¡i)¡ ®i)] dx
Corollary 1 Let (k; t) be an IC mechanism. If there is no BB and IR mechanism of the
form (k; t+ q) where q := (q1; :::; qn) is an arbitrary vector of constants, then there are no
IR and BB mechanisms that implement k:
We now examine under which conditions we can …nd an BB and IR mechanism in the
class of mechanisms of the form (k; t+ q) where (k; t) is an IC mechanism. Let eµi be the
”worst o¤” type of agent i in the mechanism (k; t). This is de…ned by
Ui(eµi) · Ui (µi) 8µi:
Theorem 2 Let (k; t) be an IC mechanism and Ti; Ui;eµi be the associated interim pay-
ments, interim utilities and ”worst o¤” types, respectively. There exists an IC, BB and
IR mechanism that implements k if and only if
nX
i=1
Eµi [Ti (µi)] ·
nX
i=1
Ui(eµi):
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The worst type’s utility Ui(eµi) can also be viewed as a maximal entry fee that can be
collected from agent i in the mechanism (k; t) such that every type of agent i still par-
ticipates. If these entry fees cover the expected payments needed to ensure IC then (and
only then) there exists an IR and BB mechanism that implements k. Such a mechanism
is then given by (k; t+ q) with q = (q1; :::; qn) = (¡U1(eµ1); :::;¡Un(eµn)):
In the sequel we focus on EF mechanisms. For a given trading situation it su¢ces to
analyze the allocation rule k¤ given by:
k¤i (µ) :=
½
1; if i = m (µ)
0; if i 6= m (µ) ;
where m (µ) := max fjj j 2 argmaxi vi (µ)g :
Any two e¢cient allocation rules di¤er only in the tie breaking rule and coincide a.e.
We can apply Theorem 1 for the e¢cient allocation rule k¤ since, for all bµi ; we have
limµi!bµi k¤i (µi; µ¡i) = k¤i
³bµi; µ¡i´ for almost all µ¡i:
3.2 The generalized Groves mechanism
We now display a mechanism which applies to the interdependent values case the idea
behind Groves mechanisms. Variations on this idea have been used to construct value-
maximizing auctions by Ausubel [1997], Dasgupta andMaskin [2000] , Jehiel andMoldovanu
[1998] and Perry and Reny [1999].
Theorem 3 Let k¤ be an e¢cient allocation rule, and let the payments t¤ be given by
t¤i (µ) :=
½
0; if k¤i (µ) = 1
vi (µ
¤
i (µ¡i) ; µ¡i) ; if k
¤
i (µ) 6= 1 ;
where µ¤i (µ¡i) is de…ned by
vi (µ
¤
i (µ¡i) ; µ¡i) = max
j 6=i
vj (µ
¤
i (µ¡i) ; µ¡i)
if the equation has a solution, and by
µ¤i (µ¡i) :=
½
µi; if vi
¡
µi; µ¡i
¢
< maxj 6=i vj
¡
µi; µ¡i
¢
µi; if vi (µi; µ¡i) > maxj 6=i vj (µi; µ¡i)
if it does not14. Then (k¤; t¤) is incentive compatible15.
14If µ¤i (µ¡i) does not exist, it can be arbitrarily chosen out of
£
µi; µi
¤
. The de…nition given here
simpli…es calculations in the next section.
15Note that truthtelling is not an equilibrium in dominant strategies, but it is an ex-post equilibrium,
i.e., it is an equilibrium no matter what the distributions of agents’ types are.
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3.3 The existence condition
We now have all the needed tools. Theorem 2 shows that an IC,EF,IR and BB mechanism
exists if and only if
nX
i=1
Eµi [Ti (µi)] ·
nX
i=1
Ui
³eµi´
for an arbitrary IC and EF mechanism. For the mechanism constructed in Theorem 3 we
have
Ti (µi) = Eµ¡i
·
vi (µ
¤
i (µ¡i) ; µ¡i) 1
µ
vi (µi; µ¡i) < max
j 6=i
vj (µi; µ¡i)
¶¸
:
Therefore we can …nd an IC, EF, IR and BB mechanism if and only if16
nX
i=1
Eµ
·
vi (µ
¤
i (µ¡i) ; µ¡i) 1
µ
vi (µi; µ¡i) < max
j 6=i
vj (µi; µ¡i)
¶¸
·
nX
i=1
Ui
³eµi´ : (1)
4 Dissolving a Partnership
We now apply the above …ndings to the dissolution of a partnership. We make the
following assumptions:
A1 Types are drawn independently from the same distribution function, e.g. Fi = F; µi =
µ; µi = µ 8i:
A2 The valuation functions vi (µ1; :::; µn) have the following form: vi (µ1; :::; µn) = g (µi)+P
j 6=i h (µj), where g; h are continuously di¤erentiable, g is strictly increasing, and
g0 > h0:
To simplify notation, we write h (µ¡i) :=
P
j 6=i h (µj) :
These conditions constitute a natural and simple generalization of the symmetry as-
sumption in Cramton et al. [1987]. Condition A2 is also needed for computational rea-
sons: it allows an explicit characterization of the ”worst o¤” participating types, which
otherwise become complex functions of the model’s parameters17 (including valuation
functions).
16The existence condition for an IC, EF, IR and ex-post budget balanced mechanism is the same: by
applying the ideas of Arrow [?], d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [1979] we can …nd an expected externality
mechanism that is ex-post budget-balanced and results in the same interim utilities and payments as the
generalized Groves mechanism. In the expected externality mechanism, however, truthtelling is not an
ex-post equilibrium.
17This assumption does not restrict a main message of this section which states that general possibility
results like in private values environments cannot be achieved if valuation functions are increasing in
other agents’ types.
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By the single crossing property and A2, we obtain:
vi (µ1; :::; µn) > vj (µ1; :::; µn), µi > µj ; (S1)
vi (µ1; :::; µn) = vj (µ1; :::; µn), µi = µj : (S2)
An EF and IC mechanism is given by (k¤; t¤) of Theorem 3. Because of S1, S2 and
A2 we have µ¤i (µ¡i) = maxj 6=i µj :
Theorem 4 1) Let eµi := F¡1(® 1n¡1i ). 1) An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and
only if:
nX
i=1
ÃZ µ
eµi g(µ)dF
n¡1 (µ)¡
Z µ
µ
g(µ)F (µ) dF n¡1 (µ)
!
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ) (Fn (µ)¡ F (µ))dµ ¸ 0: (2)
2) The set of (®1; :::; ®n) for which EF, IC, BB and IR mechanisms exist is either empty
or a symmetric, convex set around
¡
1
n
; :::; 1
n
¢
:
Condition 2 reduces to that given in Cramton et al. [1987] if g (µi) = µi and h (µi) ´ 0.
For that case, they also show that the condition is always ful…lled if ®1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ®n = 1n :
Observe that the additional term containing the common value component is negative if
h0 > 0 and positive if h0 < 0. Cramton’s et. al. [1987] result implies that, in the latter
case, a partnership can be e¢ciently dissolved if the initial property rights are distributed
equally:
Example 1 To see that both cases in Theorem 4-2 can occur, consider a setting with two
agents such that:
vi (µ1; µ2) = a µi + b µ¡i; a > b > 0;
f (µi) = 1[0;1] (µi) ; ®1 = ®2 =
1
2
:
Condition 2 reduces to:
2a
ÃZ 1
1
2
µi dµi ¡
Z 1
0
µ2i dµi
!
+ b
Z 1
0
¡
µ2i ¡ µi
¢
dµi =
1
12
a¡ 1
6
b ¸ 0
The set of shares (®1; ®2) for which an EF, IC, IR and BB mechanism exists is empty
if and only if 0 < a < 2b.
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It is interesting to compare the existence condition for interdependent values with that
for private values. For this purpose, consider a trading situation with two agents given
by
¡
F; ®1; g; h; µ; µ
¢
and two di¤erent valuation functions:
1. An interdependent valuation function vIVi (µi; µ¡i) := g (µi) + h (µ¡i) :
2. A private valuation function vPVi (µi) := g (µi) + Eµ¡i [h (µ¡i)] =: g (µi) +H:
Let (k¤; t¤) be a generalized Groves mechanism (which is a standard Groves mechanism
for vPVi ): Observe that, for all types of agent i; the interim valuation Eµ¡i [vi (µi; µ¡i)] and
interim expected utility are identical in both models. Therefore the ”worst o¤” types
are also identical, and so are their equilibrium utilities Ui(eµi): Hence, in both models we
can collect the same entry fee while insuring participation of all types. But, according to
Theorem 3, the needed (expected) transfers in the interdependent values case are given
by
Eµ
h
g
³
max
i
µi
´i
+ Eµ
h
h
³
max
i
µi
´i
;
whereas in the private values case they are given by
Eµ
h
g
³
max
i
µi
´i
+H = Eµ
h
g
³
max
i
µi
´i
+ Eµi [h ( µi)] :
If h0 > 0; the generalized Groves mechanism is more expensive than the standard Groves
mechanism18, and e¢ciency is harder to achieve with interdependent values. In particular
if an e¢cient mechanism exists for vIV ; then an e¢cient mechanism exists also for vPV .
If h0 < 0; exactly the opposite occurs: e¢ciency is easier to achieve with interdependent
values.
Our next result shows that e¢cient trade is possible for any valuation functions where
h0 · 0 and for any distribution function F; if each individual share is not too small. For
example, if there are two partners, e¢cient dissolution is always possible if the smaller
share is at least 25%.
Theorem 5 Let ®1 · ¢ ¢ ¢ · ®n , and assume that, for all i = 1; :::; n ¡ 1; we havePi
j=1 ®j ¸
¡
i
n
¢n
: Then, for any valuation function vi (µi; µ¡i) = g (µi) + h (µ¡i) with
h0 (µ¡i) · 0 and for any distribution function F , the partnership can be dissolved e¢-
ciently.
It is a-priori plausible that the above insight continues to hold if the derivative of the
common value component is positive, but su¢ciently small. We next show, however, that
this is not the case: even if that derivative is arbitrarily small but positive, there exist
distribution functions such that an equal partnership cannot be dissolved e¢ciently.
18Bergemann and Välimäki [2000] focus on the di¤erences between transfers in the CGV mechanisms
in the private and interdependent values cases in order to compare the resulting incentives for information
acquisition.
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Theorem 6 For any valuation function vi (µi; µ¡i) = g (µi) + h (µ¡i) with h0 (µ¡i) > 0
there exists a distribution function F such that the equal partnership cannot be e¢ciently
dissolved. By Theorem 4-2, for this F there is no ex-ante distribution of shares that leads
to e¢cient trade.
A distribution F with the above property puts mass on types close to the extremities
of the types’ interval. For these types, the payment di¤erence between a standard Groves
mechanism and the generalized Groves mechanism is relatively large. Since the later is
much more costly, ine¢ciency occurs.
5 Bilateral trade
We now brie‡y look at the case of two agents, one who a-priori owns the whole good (the
seller) and another one who wants to buy the good (the buyer). We denote the agents by
S and B for seller and buyer, respectively, so that i 2 fS;Bg ; ®S = 1 and ®B = 0.
For this special case the ”worst o¤” types do not depend on the functional form of the
valuation functions19, and we can allow for general valuations (as introduced in section
2).
The following Theorem20 exhibits a condition under which e¢cient trade is possible.
Theorem 7 An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and only ifZ µS
µS
Z µB
µB
(vS (µ
¤
S (µB) ; µB)¡ vB (µS; µ¤B (µS))) £
1 (k¤B (µ) = 1) fB (µB) dµBfS (µS) dµS · 0:
Assume that agents’ valuations are increasing in other agents’ types, i.e. vS;B ¸ 0; vB;S ¸
0: An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and only if:
EµS [vB (µS; µB)] ¸ EµB
£
vS
¡
µS; µB
¢¤
or vB
¡
µS; µB
¢ · vS ¡µS; µB¢
In other words, if valuations are increasing in the other agent’s type, e¢cient trade is
only possible if a price p exists such that we can always have trade at this price21, i.e. if.
EµS [vB (µS; µB)] ¸ p ¸ EµB
£
vS
¡
µS; µB
¢¤
:
19The ”worst o¤” seller is always a seller of type µS and the ”worst o¤” buyer is always a buyer of
type µB:
20The proof follows the intuition used in the previous section and is ommitted here. It can be found
in the discussion paper version, available from the authors.
21In contrast to the Akerlof model, however, we cannot a-priori restrict attention to simple mechanisms
that set prices.
Note also that a necessary condition for EµS [vB (µS; µB)] ¸ EµB
£
vS
¡
µS; µB
¢¤
to hold is that
vB (µS; µB) > vS (µS; µB) for all µS; µB.
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On the other hand, if the negative dependence of agents’ valuations on the other
agent’s type is strong enough, then e¢cient trade is possible even if the distributions of
types have overlapping support (i.e., even if the possibility of e¢cient trade is not common
knowledge)22. This phenomenon is illustrated below.
Example 2 Assume that valuations are:
vB (µS; µB) = aµB + bµS; vS (µS; µB) = aµS + bµB
with a > b; a > 0; and assume that fB (µB) = 1[0;1] (µB) ; fS (µS) = 1[0;1] (µS) : Theorem 3
shows that the following mechanism is IC and EF:
kB (µ) =
½
1 if µB ¸ µS
0 if µB < µS
tS (µ) = (a+ b) µB kB (µ) ; tB (µ) = ¡ (a+ b) µS kB (µ)
Because worst-o¤ types never trade, the mechanism designer cannot collect entry fees. He
has to pay (in expectation):
(a+ b)
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(µB ¡ µS) kB (µB; µS) dµSdµB = 1
6
(a+ b) :
For b > 0 it is more costly to achieve e¢ciency than in the private values case (where
the mechanism designer has to pay 1
6
a). For b = ¡a , everybody tells the truth without
receiving any payments at all, so that BB and IR are also ful…lled. For b < ¡a the
designer can even extract money from the traders!
6 Conclusion
In a recent survey of Mechanism Theory, Mat Jackson writes:
”There is still much that is not known about the existence or properties of
incentive compatible mechanisms that are e¢cient23 (much less the balanced
and individual rational), when there are general forms of uncertainty and
interdependencies in the preferences of individuals.” (Jackson, 2000)
Our study represents the …rst attempt at a systematic study of the above problems.
Focusing on the possibility of e¢cient trade, we have highlighted the similarities and
di¤erences between the private value case and the case with interdependent valuations.
22Gresik (1991) generally concludes that e¢cient trade is impossible. But some parts of his analysis
hold in fact only for settings where valuations increase in the other agent’s signal.
23value maximizing (n.a.)
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Our analysis generalizes and uni…es several well-known results that were obtained in
special cases. We showed how the comparison of the private and interdependent cases
crucially depends on whether valuations are increasing or decreasing in other agents’
signals.
For the Myerson-Satterthwaite and Akerlof ”extreme-ownership” settings second-best
mechanisms have been exhibited in the literature (see Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983],
Samuelson [1984], Gresik [1991]). The construction of a second-best mechanisms for the
partnership model with interdependent values is still an open question. First steps have
been undertaken by Jehiel and Pauzner [1999] and Kittsteiner [2000]. Jehiel and Pauzner
study second-best mechanisms in a setting with a single informed partner. They show
that the second-best allocation method coincides with the ex-post e¢cient allocation only
outside an interior interval of types where no trade takes place. Kittsteiner calculates
the bidding equilibrium in a speci…c mechanism - the double auction - in the partnership
model of section 4, and shows that an interior interval of types will not participate in the
auction. He also shows that, in some situations, there are mechanisms which are welfare
superior to the double auction24.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof follows that for private values (see e.g. Myerson [1981]).
There is one additional argument needed to justify the di¤erentiation under the integral.
Incentive compatibility implies:
Ui (µi; µi) ¸ Ui
³
µi;bµi´ and Ui ³bµi;bµi´ ¸ Ui ³bµi; µi´ 8 µi;bµi:
We therefore obtain the following inequalities:
Vi
³bµi;bµi´¡ Vi ³µi;bµi´ ¸ Ui ³bµi;bµi´¡ Ui (µi; µi) ¸ Vi ³bµi; µi´¡ Vi (µi; µi) :
Dividing by bµi ¡ µi gives
Eµ¡i
24vi
³bµi; µ¡i´¡ vi (µi; µ¡i)bµi ¡ µi
³
ki
³bµi; µ¡i´¡ ®i´
35 ¸ Ui
³bµi;bµi´¡ Ui (µi; µi)bµi ¡ µi
¸ Eµ¡i
24vi
³bµi; µ¡i´¡ vi (µi; µ¡i)bµi ¡ µi (ki (µi; µ¡i)¡ ®i)
35 :
24Note that a double auction is a second-best mechanism in private values environments.
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Because vi is continuously di¤erentiable and because limbµi!µi ki (µi; µ¡i) = ki
³bµi; µ¡i´ a.e.
we can take the limit bµi ! µi and apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem to obtain
Eµ¡i [vi;1 (µi; µ¡i) (ki (µi; µ¡i)¡ ®i)] ¸
dU (µi)
dµi
¸ Eµ¡i [vi;1 (µi; µ¡i) (ki (µi; µ¡i)¡ ®i)]
and therefore that U (µi) is di¤erentiable with
dU(µi)
dµi
= Eµ¡i [vi;1 (µi; µ¡i) (ki (µi; µ¡i)¡ ®i)]
Proof of Corollary1: Fix an IC mechanism that implements k and has the pay-
ment functions ti (µ1; :::; µn) ; i = 1; :::; n. Observe that a mechanism (k; t+ r) with
r = (r1; :::; rn) ; where ri is an arbitrary constant also implements k: Consider an arbi-
trary mechanism that implements k and has payment functions si (µ) and interim pay-
ment functions Si (µi) := Eµ¡i [si (µi; µ¡i)]. Denote by U
s
i (µi) and by U
t+r
i (µi) the interim
equilibrium utilities of agents participating in (k; s) and (k; t+ r) ; respectively. Because
the interim utilities of the participating agents are (up to a constant) the same for all IC
mechanisms that implement k, we can …nd constants qi such that U si (µi) = U
t+q
i (µi) :This
means that for every IC mechanism (k; s) we can …nd a mechanism (k; t+ q) that is equiv-
alent to (k; s) in terms of interim utilities. This leads to the following important obser-
vation: If the mechanism (k; s) is BB and IR, then the mechanism (k; t+ q) is also BB
and IR. To check this note that U t+qi (µi) = U
s
i (µi) ¸ 0 and that
Pn
i=1Eµi [Ti (µi) + qi] =Pn
i=1Eµi
£
U t+qi (µi)¡ Vi (µi; µi)
¤
=
Pn
i=1Eµi [Si (µi)] · 0:
Proof of Theorem 2: Given a mechanism (k; t) that implements k; let eµi be the
”worst o¤” type of agent i: Let q = (q1; :::; qn) be a vector of constants. Because of
U t+qi (µi) = U
t
i (µi) + qi the ”worst o¤” type of player i in the mechanism (k; t+ q) is also
given by eµi. We are looking for constants qi such that the mechanism (k; t+ q) is BB
and IR, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 (Eµi [Ti (µi)] + qi) · 0 and U t+qi
³eµi´ = U ti ³eµi´ + qi ¸ 0 8i: These
conditions can hold if and only if
Pn
i=1Eµi [Ti (µi)] ·
Pn
i=1 U
t
i
³eµi´ :
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider agent i and assume that all agents other than i report
their types µ¡i truthfully. Assume …rst, that 8 µi we have vi (µi; µ¡i) > maxj 6=i vj (µi; µ¡i)
or vi (µi; µ¡i) < maxj 6=i vj (µi; µ¡i) : Then i0s report does not change the allocation k¤:
Because payments do not depend on µi, it is optimal for i to report truthfully.
Assume now that vi (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) = maxj 6=i vj (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) for µ
¤
i 2
£
µi; µi
¤
, and that the true
type of agent i is µi: We distinguish several cases:
1. µi > µ
¤
i : Any report bµi > µ¤i does not change the allocation (agent i still gets the
good) because we have
vi (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) = max
j 6=i
vj (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) and vi;i (µi; µ¡i) > vj;i (µi; µ¡i) 8 j 6= i
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) vi
³bµi; µ¡i´ > max
j 6=i
vj
³bµi; µ¡i´ :
Payments are not a¤ected by reporting bµi > µi either. If i reports bµi < µ¤i he
won’t get the good any more but receives the payment vi (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) < vi (µi; µ¡i)
and therefore it is optimal to report µi instead of bµi. If bµi = µ¤i agent i gets either
vi (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) or vi (µi; µ¡i). So he cannot improve his payo¤ by lying.
2. µi < µ
¤
i : As long as i announces bµi < µ¤i he doesn’t change the allocation because we
have vi
³bµi; µ¡i´ < maxj 6=i vj ³bµi; µ¡i´. If bµi > µ¤i he will get the good but values it
vi (µi; µ¡i) which is less than the payment he gets by reporting truthfully, vi (µ¤i ; µ¡i).
As above truth-telling yields at least the same as reporting bµi = µ¤i :
3. µi = µ¤i : In this case agent i will always have the utility vi (µ
¤
i ; µ¡i) (independent of
his announcement) and therefore optimally reports the truth.
Proof of Theorem 4: 1) We have to show that conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
For this, we …rst determine the interim utilities of the ”worst o¤” types and the expected
payments to the agents. The interim expected utility of agent i with type µi is given by:
Ui(µi) = Eµ¡i
·
vi(µi; µ¡i) 1(µi > max
j 6=i
µj)+
+vi
µ
max
j 6=i
µj; µ¡i
¶
1(µi < max
j 6=i
µj)¡ ®ivi(µi; µ¡i)
¸
:
The ”worst o¤” type eµi satis…es eµi = argminµi Ui (µi) : The …rst order condition of this
minimization problem gives
0 = Eµ¡i
·
@
@ µi
vi (µi; µ¡i)
µ
1(µi > max
j 6=i
µj)¡ ®i
¶¸
= g0(µi) Eµ¡i[1(µi > max
j 6=i
µj)¡ ®i] = g0(µi) (F n¡1(µi)¡ ®i)
This yields eµi = F¡1(® 1n¡1i ) . This is the only minimum because Fn¡1(µi)¡®i is negative
for µi < eµi and positive for µi > eµi. The interim utility Ui ³eµi´ is given by
Ui
³eµi´ = Eµ¡i ·vi(eµi; µ¡i) 1(eµi > max
j 6=i
µj) + vi
µ
max
j 6=i
µj ; µ¡i
¶
1(eµi < max
j 6=i
µj)¡ ®ivi(eµi; µ¡i)¸ :
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Using µ¤i (µ¡i) = maxj 6=i µj condition (1) writes:
nX
i=1
Eµ¡i
·
vi(eµi; µ¡i) 1(eµi > max
j 6=i
µj) + vi
µ
max
j 6=i
µj; µ¡i
¶
1(eµi < max
j 6=i
µj)¡ ®ivi(eµi; µ¡i)¸
¡
nX
i=1
Eµ
·
vi
µ
max
j 6=i
µj; µ¡i
¶
1
µ
vi (µi; µ¡i) < max
j 6=i
vj (µi; µ¡i)
¶¸
¸ 0:
Using separability and symmetry of the valuation functions, we obtain (for some i)
nX
j=1
"Z µ
eµj g (µ) dF
n¡1 (µ)¡
Z µ
µ
g (µ) F (µ) dF n¡1 (µ)
#
+(n¡ 1) Eµ¡i
"X
j 6=i
h (µj)
#
¡ n Eµ¡i
"X
j 6=i
h (µj) F
µ
max
j 6=i
µj
¶#
¸ 0:
Integration by parts gives
(n¡ 1) Eµ¡i
"X
j 6=i
h (µj)
#
¡ n Eµ¡i
"X
j 6=i
h (µj) F
µ
max
j 6=i
µj
¶#
= (n¡ 1) n
Z µ
µ
h (µ)
"Z µ
µ
F n¡2 (M) f (M) dM ¡ 1
n
#
f (µ) dµ:
Using
R µ
µ
F n¡2 (M) f (M) dM = 1¡F
n¡1(µ)
n¡1 and n
R µ
µ
h (µ)F n¡1 (µ) f (µ) dµ = h
¡
µ
¢ ¡R µ
µ
h0 (µ)Fn (µ) dµ we get the wished result.
2) Consider Ã : [0; 1]n 7! R with
Ã (®1; :::; ®n) =
nX
i=1
ÃZ µ
eµi g(µ) dF
n¡1(µ) dµ ¡
Z µ
µ
g(µ) F (µ) dFn¡1 (µ) dµ
!
+
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ) (F n (µ)¡ F (µ)) dµ:
The function Ã is symmetric in its arguments and concave (recall that ®i = F n¡1
³eµi´):
@Ã
@®i
= ¡ g(eµi) (n¡ 1)F n¡2 ³eµi´ f(eµi) deµi
d®i
= ¡g
³eµi´ dF n¡1
³eµi´
d®i
= ¡g
³eµi´ ;
@2Ã
@®2i
= ¡g0
³eµi´ deµi
d®i
< 0:
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Because of symmetry, Ã takes its maximum on the simplex
Pn
i=1 ®i = 1 at
1
n
; :::; 1
n
; and
the set of (®1; :::; ®n) that lead to positive values of Ã is either symmetric and convex, or
empty.
Proof of Theorem 5: We have eµi = F¡1µ® 1n¡1i ¶ and therefore eµ1 · ¢ ¢ ¢ · eµn:
Integration by parts in condition 2 yields:
nX
i=1
Ã
g
¡
µ
¢¡ ®ig ³eµi´¡ Z µeµi g0 (µ)F n¡1 (µ) dµ
!
¡ (n¡ 1) g ¡µ¢+ (n¡ 1) Z µ
µ
g0 (µ)Fn (µ) dµ
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ) (F n (µ)¡ F (µ)) dµ
¸
nX
i=1
Z µ
eµi g
0 (µ)
¡
®i ¡ F n¡1 (µ)
¢
dµ + (n¡ 1)
Z µ
µ
g0 (µ) F n (µ) dµ
=
Z µ
eµn g
0 (µ)
¡
1¡ nF n¡1 (µ) + (n¡ 1)F n (µ)¢ dµ + n¡1X
i=1
Z eµn
eµi g
0 (µ)
¡
®i ¡ F n¡1 (µ)
¢
dµ
+(n¡ 1)
Z eµn
µ
g0 (µ) F n (µ) dµ
¸
n¡1X
i=1
Z eµi+1
eµi g
0 (µ)
Ã
iX
j=1
®j ¡ iFn¡1 (µ) + (n¡ 1)Fn (µ)
!
dµ
Since for all i; 1 · i · n ¡ 1; iF n¡1 (µ) ¡ (n¡ 1)F n (µ) · ¡ i
n
¢n
the last expression is
non-negative.
Proof of Theorem 6: It is su¢cient to show that for any function vi = g (µi)+h (µ¡i)
with h0 > 0 there exists a distribution function F such that e¢cient trade fails for ®1 =
¢ ¢ ¢ = ®n = 1n . Integration by parts shows that condition 2 is equivalent to:
Z µ
eµ g
0 (µ)
¡
1¡ nF n¡1 (µ) + (n¡ 1)F n (µ)¢ dµ + (n¡ 1)Z eµ
µ
g0 (µ) F n (µ) dµ
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ) (F n (µ)¡ F (µ)) dµ ¸ 0:
Let a := maxµ2[µ;µ] g
0(µ) > 0 and b := minµ2[µ;µ] h
0(µ) > 0: Since 1 ¡ nFn¡1 (µ) +
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(n¡ 1)F n (µ) ¸ 0 it su¢ces to show that there exists a distribution F such that
a
Z µ
eµ
¡
1¡ nF n¡1 (µ) + (n¡ 1)F n (µ)¢ dµ + a (n¡ 1)Z eµ
µ
F n (µ) dµ
+b
Z µ
µ
(F n (µ)¡ F (µ)) dµ < 0: (3)
We …rst show that this is the case for the discontinuous distribution F ¤ given by:
F ¤ (µ) =
8<:
³
1
n
b
(n¡1)a+b
´ 1
n¡1
if µ 2 [µ; µ)
1 if µ = µ
:
We set eµ = µ because F ¤ (µ) < ¡ 1
n
¢ 1
n¡1 for all µ < 1: Calculating (3) for F ¤ yields:
a (n¡ 1)
Z µ
µ
µ
1
n
b
(n¡ 1) a+ b
¶ n
n¡1
dµ
+b
Z µ
µ
Ã µ
1
n
b
(n¡ 1) a+ b
¶ n
n¡1
¡
µ
1
n
b
(n¡ 1) a+ b
¶ 1
n¡1
!
dµ
=
¡
µ ¡ µ¢ · (a (n¡ 1) + b)µ1
n
b
(n¡ 1) a+ b
¶
¡ b
¸µ
1
n
b
(n¡ 1) a+ b
¶ 1
n¡1
< 0:
We now construct a sequence o¤ cumulative distribution functions that are feasible
and ”arbitrarily close” to F ¤ . Therefore, such distribution functions will also violate
the existence condition. Let µM :=
(µ¡µ)
2
and K :=
³
1
n
b
(n¡1)a+b
´ 1
n¡1
, and consider the
following sequence of cumulative distribution functions25 Fm for odd m > 1 26:
Fm (µ) =
8<:
³
µ¡µM
µ¡µM
´m
(1¡K) +K if µ ¸ µM
K
³
µ¡µM
µM¡µ
´m
+K if µ < µM :
For m large enough Fm satis…es condition (3) , which completes the proof.
25Observe that they are strictly increasing and di¤erentiable.
26This will yield eµm = F¡1µ 1
m
1
m¡1
¶
:
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